Chenhao Xu1,2,*, Qiyang Han1,2, Yingyu Chen1,2, and Zhiwei Zhang1,2
Chenhao Xu
1Shaanxi Key Laboratory of Network and System Security, Xidian University, Xi’an 710126, China
2School of Computer Science and Technology, Xidian University, Xi’an 710126, China
*Corresponding author
Intelligent unmanned systems are increasingly deployed in mission-critical scenarios, where attacks may enter through navigation signals, communication links, software interfaces, terminal devices, actuators, or human–machine interactions and propagate across sensing, computation and control, communication, actuation, and mission processes. Existing surveys are generally organized around specific platforms, components, or isolated security domains, making it difficult to characterize cross-layer propagation and the organizational relationships among multiple attack entries. This paper proposes a threat-entry-oriented multi-domain analysis framework for intelligent unmanned systems. Heterogeneous systems are mapped to a unified five-layer operational architecture, while attack impacts are projected into the physical, computing, network, and mission domains. Based on the number of actively manipulated entries and their entry-opening causal relationships, threats are classified into single-entry, parallel-entry, and cascading-entry threats. Using a structured narrative review, we synthesize academic research and representative real-world security incidents, distinguishing direct platform or platform-subsystem evidence from evidence transferred from related systems. Academic studies are organized according to single-entry, parallel-entry, and cascading-entry threat structures, while real-world incidents are analyzed in terms of attack entries, propagation mechanisms, cross-domain impacts, and system- or mission-level consequences. Based on the common characteristics of these threats, corresponding security requirements are derived for entry trustworthiness, cross-domain consistency, attack-chain containment, trust-boundary control, safe degradation, and trusted recovery.
Intelligent unmanned systems, threat-entry analysis, cross-layer propagation, cross-domain security, cyber-physical security, mission resilience
Chenhao Xu, Qiyang Han, Yingyu Chen, and Zhiwei Zhang (2026). A Survey of Security Threats to Intelligent Unmanned Systems. Journal of Networking and Network Applications, Volume 6, Issue 4, pp. 196–216. https://doi.org/10.33969/J-NaNA.2026.060402.
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