Efficient Anonymous Authentication Scheme in Body Area Networks Via Signal Propagation Characterization

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Owing to its capability to measure the sensitive biological data of patients through embedded sensors and transmit them via open wireless channels to remote medical experts, wireless body area network (WBAN) has been playing an important role in pervasive healthcare systems. However, the open nature of the wireless channels renders the data susceptible to being eavesdropped by an adversary and linked to the identities of the transmitting devices, which can enable the adversary to gain sensitive information and launch targeted physical attacks. Therefore, anonymous authentication and confidentiality of the data in WBAN are vital. In the last few years, numerous anonymous authentication schemes based on cryptographic primitives and physiological features were designed to enhance security in WBAN. However, most of the existing schemes are not computationally efficient or require additional sensing hardware. To address these limitations, we propose an efficient anonymous authentication scheme for WBAN based on signal propagation characteristics. The key idea in the proposed scheme is to utilize the distinct received signal strength (RSS) variation profiles between on-body and off-body communication channels to conceal the identities of communicating devices, thereby ensuring their anonymity during authentication. We perform security and performance analyses of the proposed approach to prove its security strength and computational efficiency, respectively. Moreover, extensive experiments are conducted on human volunteers in indoor and outdoor environments to show the robustness of our approach. The results of the analyses and the experiments show that our scheme can successfully mitigate 88.8\% of active attack attempts with less computation overhead.

\textbf{Index Terms}—Wireless body area network (WBAN), authentication, anonymity, signal propagation characteristics.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the advances in wearable devices and embedded technology, interests in wireless body area network (WBAN) have developed in recent years \cite{1, 2}. A WBAN is a network of low power sensors positioned on patients’ bodies to measure and send their sensitive physiological data such as body temperature to healthcare experts over unprotected wireless channels. These collected data are then used for real-time clinical diagnosis. WBAN has several applications, such as personal health care monitoring and emergency medical services \cite{3, 4}, and thus its use could revolutionize healthcare provision in modern medical systems. However, the open nature of the wireless channels causes the patients’ sensitive data to be susceptible to security attacks and unauthorized access. Specifically, an adversary may monitor the sensitive data of the patients during transmission, perform traffic analysis, and link the data to the identities of the devices in transmission. Even without recognizing the context of the data, the adversary can gain useful information by just knowing which sensor is transmitting. For instance, an unusual traffic from a blood pressure sensor discloses to the adversary that this patient has a blood pressure related problem. With information like this, the adversary can launch effective attacks targeting specific devices \cite{5, 6}. Therefore, reliable anonymous authentication while considering the inadequate resources of the devices in WBAN is essential to the WBAN’s security and the well-being of the patients.

Related researches on anonymous authentication in body area network can be mainly categorized into cryptographic and non-cryptographic schemes. The existing cryptographic anonymous authentication techniques \cite{5, 6, 7} are based on traditional encryption and decryption algorithms, which rely on pre-distributed secrets. The strength of these schemes is that they are computationally impossible to be broken by an adversary that does not possess the decryption keys. However, these schemes have heavy computations such as bilinear pairing, which cannot be executed by the resource-constrained WBAN devices. Non-cryptographic anonymous authentication schemes, on the other hand, are based on physiological features \cite{8, 9} (e.g., electrocardiogram (ECG)), which are measured separately at a sender and a receiver and compared to establish trust. These schemes are more preferable due to their less computation. However, the schemes are susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attack considering that the measured biological features by different devices for the same person may be different. Besides, additional sensing hardware that is usually required makes them cost-prohibitive.

We can establish from the aforementioned discussion that, both the schemes based on cryptographic primitives and physiological features can ensure anonymous authentication in WBAN. However, the cryptographic based approaches are not computationally efficient, while the schemes based on the physiological features require additional sensing hardware. The devices in WBAN have limited resources (including hardware, energy, and user interfaces) and thus cannot perform...
the expensive computations in the cryptographic-based schemes. The requirement of additional sensing hardware in the available physiological feature-based approaches, on the other hand, is not only cost-prohibitive but can lead to compatibility issues with legacy systems. To address these shortcomings, we propose in this paper, a computationally efficient anonymous authentication scheme for WBAN based on physical (PHY) layer signal propagation characteristics with no additional sensing hardware requirement. The main idea in the proposed scheme is to exploit the distinct received signal strength (RSS) variation signatures between on-body and off-body channels in WBAN to mask the identities of communicating devices during authentication. We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows.

1) We propose an efficient anonymous authentication scheme for WBAN, which exploits the inherent RSS variation profiles between on-body and off-body channels in WBAN to ensure the anonymity of the communicating on-body devices.

2) We perform security analysis to prove the resilience of our scheme to security attacks and performance analysis to demonstrate its computational efficiency.

3) Finally, we validate the robustness of our approach via comprehensive experiments on 6 human volunteers in real-world places. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach can successfully provide anonymous authentication in WBAN while remaining computationally attractive.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related works are reviewed in Section II. System models and preliminaries are presented in Section III. In Section IV, we present the proposed anonymous authentication approach. In Section V, we conduct the security and performance analyses of the proposed approach. In Section VI, we present the evaluation of our approach in real-world environments, followed by the conclusion of our work in Section VII.

II. RELATED WORKS

A. Cryptographic Based Anonymous Authentication

Several anonymous authentication techniques based on bilinear pairing were proposed for WBAN [10], [11]. In [6], Liu et al. proposed a remote anonymous authentication technique based on bilinear pairing defined on an elliptic curve. However, their approach is prone to impersonation attack [6]. To fix the security limitation in [5], He et al. [5] designed another bilinear pairing based anonymous authentication approach, where security credentials are stored on a network manager. However, Wei et al. [7] proved that the scheme in [6] only achieves weak anonymity. To address this limitation, the authors in [7] proposed an anonymous authentication scheme using low entropy password. In [11], an authentication framework for WBAN with clients’ anonymity and location privacy is designed based on bilinear pairing. However, their scheme is not computationally efficient. To overcome the computational cost of bilinear pairing, lightweight hash function and exclusive-OR (XOR) operations are used to design anonymous authentication techniques in WBAN [12], [13]. In [12], Li et al. used XOR and hash function operations to design an authentication technique for a centralized two-hop WBAN. However, this scheme is insecure against node impersonation attack. An anonymous authentication scheme that adaptively selects relay nodes in normal situations and emergencies is proposed in [13]. A dynamic password is utilized in [16] to propose a robust authentication scheme for WBAN. A lightweight mutual authentication scheme based on hash function and XOR operation is proposed in [17], which ensures forward secrecy. However, the scheme provides weak anonymity. Compared to other cryptographic techniques, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) offers equal security with a much lesser key size. Consequently, ECC-based anonymous authentication schemes are proposed in WBAN [18], [19], [20]. In [21], Shen et al. proposed a multilayer authentication scheme based on ECC. Unfortunately, their scheme requires a group key update every time a node is added or deleted. In [8], a unique pseudo identity and a polynomial share generated for each device by a trusted authority are used for authentication in WBAN.

The major drawback of cryptographic-based anonymous authentication schemes is their high computational complexity. In contrast, our scheme is less complex as it uses lightweight cryptographic primitives and channel characteristics measurements for authentication, which can be easily executed by the resource-limited WBAN devices.

B. Physiological Feature Based Anonymous Authentication

To address the high computational complexity of cryptographic-based anonymous authentication schemes, physiological features are measured separately at a sender and a receiver and compared to establish trust in WBAN. A hybrid anonymous authentication technique using an ECG signal is proposed in [9] to solve the security shortcomings of [12]. However, the approach in [9] lacks forward secrecy and requires additional sensing hardware, which is cost-prohibitive. A time-invariant fingerprint identifier and a time-varient ECG feature are used in [22] for authentication in WBAN. A bloom filter is introduced in [23] to conceal generated ECG features used for authentication in WBAN. However, their scheme achieves weak anonymity. In [24], eight fiducial features are extracted from a single heartbeat and used for authentication in WBAN. Unfortunately, the scheme suffers from feature learning overhead. In [25], Peris–Lopez et al. proposed an ECG based continuous authentication mechanism with an attacker characterization. However, the additional ECG sensor required in their scheme incurs hardware cost.

The limitations of physiological feature-based anonymous authentication schemes are their vulnerability to DoS attack and the requirement of additional sensing hardware. In contrast, our scheme is different in two ways. First, it does not require additional sensing hardware to measure the RSS values of exchanged messages between devices. Second, the measured RSS values are required to be within some acceptable threshold for authentication instead of being equal. Thus, the issue of the DoS attack is addressed in our scheme.
III. System Models and Preliminaries

In this section, we present the network and threat models used in the proposed approach as well as some preliminaries.

A. Network Model and Assumptions

As illustrated in Fig. 1, the network model in our scheme is composed of three entities, which are sensor nodes, a controller node, and an off-body attacker device.

Sensor Nodes (SNs): There are \( n \) sensor nodes in our network, which are positioned on the patients’ bodies to measure and transmit their biomedical data to medical experts for clinical diagnosis. The SNs have equal but limited resources, which make them unable to transmit the measured data directly to the medical professionals. Instead, the SNs transmit the data to a controller node, which is always within their transmission range as it is positioned at the center of the body of the patients.

Controller Node (CN): The controller node in our network is a smartphone that is positioned at the center of the body and has more resources than the SNs. The CN collects and relays the measured data from the SNs to medical servers \([3]\), where medical experts can access them. Please note that the mode of communication between the SNs and the CN is half-duplex and they communicate directly via bluetooth over wireless channels. Moreover, to prevent interference between the signals of different communication links, we exclusively allocate all system resources to one communication link at a time. It should also be noted that creeping waves diffracted and trapped along the human body surface dominate the propagation of the on-body radio wave between the SNs and the CN, while the signal propagation between the CN and the attacker device is dominated by signal components arriving from several multipath radio channels caused by signal reflecting objects such as walls and floors \([4]\). In addition, anonymous authentication is needed before data is transmitted between any of the SNs and the CN.

Attacker Device (A): The attacker device in our network is assumed to be an off-body device, which is not located on the same body as the legitimate SNs and the CN. It is, however, assumed to always be located within the proximity of few meters from the patient’s body. More discussions on the capabilities of the attacker device are given in subsection III-B

B. Threat Model

We consider the following adversarial model in this paper.

- We use the Dolev-Yao (DY) attack model \([26]\) where the attacker can capture transmitted messages, modify or delete some parts of the messages.
- The adversary can obtain the identities of devices from captured messages.
- The adversary can estimate the channel characteristics between the legitimate devices and itself.
- The adversary can initiate impersonation, man-in-the-middle, and replay attacks.

C. Theoretical Explanation of the Noticeable RSS Variation Signatures Between On-body and Off-body Channels

For succinctness, an on-body channel refers to a wireless link where both transceivers are situated on the same human body, whereas an off-body channel refers to a wireless channel where one of the transceivers is located on the body and the other is not. Previous empirical measurements \([4]\), \([27]\), \([28]\) have demonstrated that there are significant RSS variation signatures between on-body and off-body channels because of the differences in the behavior of the signal waves as they travel on these channels. Although the propagation of the radio waves is reported to be influenced by multipath fading, direct path loss, and shadowing \([28]\), the radio wave propagation on an on-body channel is mainly dominated by diffracted creeping waves that are trapped on the human body surface. This is due to the low-loss dielectric nature of the human body at microwave frequencies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.

According to the theory of creeping wave \([29]\), the electric field \((E)\) released by the antenna of a transmitter over the human body on an elliptic path at a distance \((d)\) between transmitter \((T)\) and receiver \((R)\) is expressed as

\[
E = 2\sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon}{2\pi}} \sqrt{P_T G_T} e^{-j\omega d} F(\alpha, \beta, \theta, \vartheta),
\]

where \(\varepsilon\) is the vacuum wave impedance, \(P_T\) is the transmission power in watts, \(G_T\) is the transmitter antenna gain, \(\omega\) is the wave number in free space, \(F(.)\) is the signal’s fading factor, which is a function of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) (with \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) respectively denoting the semi-major and semi-minor axes of the ellipse), \(\theta\) is the signal’s leaving point angle at \(T\), and \(\vartheta\) is the signal’s receiving point angle at \(R\). Moreover, the horizontal component of the electric field has a much higher attenuation than the vertical component \([29]\) and thus, the antenna orientation on the body also impacts the path loss of the creeping waves greatly.

Eq. [1] hints that, rather than environmental dynamics, body surface as well as the orientations of the \(T\) and \(R\) antennas are the dominant components of the on-body radio wave propagations. Particularly, when two transceivers are positioned on the same body, motion of the body of any kind can adjust the body surface and the antenna locations, which can cause changes in the distance \(d\) between the \(T\) and \(R\) as well as the signal’s fading factor \(F(.)\). Consequently, on-body RSS would be steady when the body is static and fluctuates significantly when all or some parts of the body are in motion.
In contrast, the environmental dynamics and the distance between the two communicating antennas are the dominant components of the off-body radio wave propagations. This is largely attributed to the absence of the human body and the presence of free space between the $T$ and $R$ antennas. Thus, any changes in the environment or the distance between the two antennas will cause a significant RSS fluctuation at the $R$ side. To this end, our proposed scheme utilizes these variations to hide the identities of the communicating devices and distinguish between their signals and those of the off-body attacker.

IV. THE PROPOSED ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

In this section, we propose the anonymous authentication method for on-body devices in WBAN. As shown in Fig. 2 when SN and CN wish to authenticate each other anonymously, they start by exchanging messages that are empty and generating their RSS values. Next, the SN and the CN separately generate authentication parameters $V_1$ and $V_2$ using their identities and the generated RSS values. These authentication parameters are then exchanged by the SN and the CN and used to prove anonymously to each other that they are both on the same human body. Since the received RSS measurements depend on a receiver antenna, which is expected to be different for CN and the different kind of SNs in practice, our scheme does not require an exact match of the authentication parameters $V_1$ and $V_1^*$ or $V_2$ and $V_2^*$ at both ends for authentication. This is because it is impossible to guarantee that the received RSS of two different devices will be similar in practice. Thus, our scheme requires that the difference between the authentication parameters (i.e., $V_1 - V_1^*$ and $V_2 - V_2^*$) be within some acceptable threshold for authentication. This is made feasible in the proposed scheme due to the sufficiently distinct signal propagation profiles between on-body and off-body channels.

Our scheme is made up of two phases: a deployment phase and an authentication phase. In the deployment phase, the devices are placed on the body of the users together with their corresponding security parameters and identities. In the authentication phase, on the other hand, the devices engage each other for secure anonymous authentication. Please note that the deployment phase is carried out only once except when there is a new device to be deployed, while the authentication phase is executed whenever two devices wish to exchange data anonymously. The notations used in our approach are described in Table I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID$_{SN}$</td>
<td>Real identity of SN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID$_{CN}$</td>
<td>Real identity of CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth$_{req.}$</td>
<td>Authentication request identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auth$_{ack.}$</td>
<td>Authentication acknowledgment identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K$_{SN}$</td>
<td>Master key of SN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K$_{CN}$</td>
<td>Master key of CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K$_S$</td>
<td>Session key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS$_{SN}$</td>
<td>Received signal strength value generated by SN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS$_{CN}$</td>
<td>Received signal strength value generated by CN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>A threshold value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNG($s$)</td>
<td>A random number generator that generates 128 bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\oplus$</td>
<td>Bitwise XOR operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E(K[a])$</td>
<td>A symmetric encryption function, which uses a key $K$ to encrypt “a” using XOR operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V_1, V_1^<em>, V_2, V_2^</em>$</td>
<td>Authentication parameters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A. Deployment Phase**

At this phase, a network administrator (NA) deploys the devices with the following steps.

**Step 1:** Positions the SNs and the CN on the body according to the network model.

**Step 2:** Picks the secret identities $ID_{SN}$ for each SN and $ID_{CN}$ for the CN.

**Step 3:** Picks a random $K_{SN}$ and stores it on the memories of each SN. The NA also picks a random $K_{CN}$ and stores it on the memories of CN and each of the SNs.

**B. Authentication Phase**

At this phase, we describe the 5 authentication steps as depicted in Fig. 3, which are followed in the proposed scheme whenever SN and CN wish to exchange data anonymously.

**Step 1:** $SN \rightarrow CN (Auth$_{req.}$).

SN sends an $Auth_{req.}$ to CN indicating that it wishes to perform anonymous authentication with the CN.
Step 2: CN \rightarrow SN (Auth\text{\_ack}.)

Upon reception of the message from SN, if CN wishes to perform anonymous authentication with the SN, it first obtains the RSS value of this message denoted as $RSS_{CN}$. CN then sends back a message containing $Auth_{\text{ack}}$ to the SN.

Step 3: SN \rightarrow CN \((V_1, Y_{SN})\).

Upon reception of the message from SN, if CN proceeds as follows.

- Obtains the RSS value of the message denoted as $RSS_{SN}$.
- Computes $X_{SN} = K_{SN} \oplus ID_{SN}$.
- Computes $Y_{SN} = X_{SN} \oplus K_{CN}$.
- Computes $V_1 = ID_{RSS_{SN}}^*$.
- Sends the tuple $(V_1, Y_{SN})$ to CN.

Step 4: CN \rightarrow SN \((V_2, Y_{CN})\).

Upon reception of the tuple $(V_1, Y_{SN})$ from the SN, the CN proceeds as follows.

- Computes $X_{SN} = Y_{SN} \oplus K_{CN}$.
- Computes $ID_{SN} = K_{SN} \oplus X_{SN}$.
- Computes $V_1^* = ID_{RSS_{SN}}^*$.
- Checks if $|V_1 - V_1^*| \leq \sigma$ (aborts the communication and ends the session if $|V_1 - V_1^*| > \sigma$).
- Computes $RSS_{SN} = log_{ID_{SN}} V_1$ (this log operation is needed for the CN to obtain the RSS value of SN and use it to generate a session key $K_S$).
- Computes $K_S = RNG \left( RSS_{SN}^{RSS_{CN}} \right)$.
- Computes $X_{CN} = K_{CN} \oplus ID_{CN}$.
- Computes $Y_{CN} = X_{CN} \oplus K_{SN}$.
- Computes $V_2 = ID_{RSS_{SN}}^*$.
- Sends the tuple $(V_2, Y_{CN})$ to SN.

Step 5: SN \rightarrow CN \((E(K_S [DATA]))\).

When the SN receives the tuple $(V_2, Y_{CN})$ from the CN, it proceeds as follows.

- Computes $X_{CN} = Y_{CN} \oplus K_{SN}$.
- Computes $ID_{CN} = K_{CN} \oplus X_{CN}$.
- Computes $V_2^* = ID_{RSS_{SN}}^*$.
- Checks if $|V_2 - V_2^*| \leq \sigma$ (aborts the communication and ends the session if $|V_2 - V_2^*| > \sigma$).
- Computes $RSS_{CN} = log_{ID_{CN}} V_2$ (this log operation is needed for the SN to obtain the RSS value of CN and use it to generate a session key $K_S$).
- Computes $K_S = RNG \left( RSS_{SN}^{RSS_{CN}} \right)$.
- Sends $DATA$ encrypted using the computed session key $K_S$ (i.e., $E(K_S [DATA])$) to the CN.

Please note that we formulated the authentication problem in our proposed scheme as a binary hypothesis test to decide whether a message received by a destination device comes from a genuine device or an attacker. Therefore, when a destination gets a message at time $t$, it performs the hypothesis test below.

$$H_0: M(t) = M_{LD}(t)$$

$$H_1: M(t) = M_A(t)$$

where the null hypothesis $H_0$ denotes that the origin of the received message $M(t)$ is a legitimate device (LD), and the alternative hypothesis $H_1$ implies that the origin of the received message $M(t)$ is the attacker (A).

The authentication efficiency of our proposed scheme is based on a test threshold we estimated experimentally in a lab and a corridor located outside the lab. We used one Arduino device and one android smartphone in the experiments, which we positioned on a volunteer’s body as SN and CN, respectively. Moreover, to simulate the off-body attacker, we asked another volunteer to hold another Arduino device and move within the proximity of the other volunteer during the experiments that lasted for 10 minutes in the lab and the corridor. During the experiments, each of the SN and the adversary exchange packets with the CN and vice versa in the following motions of the body of the volunteer: 1) sitting and standing in the lab, and 2) standing and walking in the corridor. The RSS values of the exchanged packets between the devices are generated and used to calculate the values of the authentication parameters $V_1, V_1^*, V_2, V_2^*$.

We notice that the differences are small values between the CN and the SN, and large values between the CN and the adversary. We attribute these variations between the results to the following reason. As explained before, the propagation of the signal on the body is impacted by the surface of the body and the orientations of the devices’ antennas. Thus, the effect of the body on the RSS values of the CN and the SN is almost the same since the devices are both located on the same body. This makes their RSS values to be close and hence the reason for the small differences between their calculated authentication parameters. In contrast, since the attacker in our scheme is not located on the same body as the CN, its RSS values are influenced by environmental dynamics and are not correlated with the RSS values of the CN. As a result, the calculated differences between their authentication parameters are large values. Based on these experimental observations, we conclude that if the generated results of $(|V_1 - V_1^*|)$ and $(|V_2 - V_2^*|)$ are less than or equals to a threshold value $\sigma$, the destination devices in our scheme accept $H_0$, otherwise they accept $H_1$. Therefore, the hypothesis test $(T)$ applied by the destination devices in our scheme is

$$T = R \overset{H_0}{\underset{H_1}{\sim}} \sigma,$$

where $R$ is the result of either $(|V_1 - V_1^*|)$ or $(|V_2 - V_2^*|)$. 

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Fig. 3. The steps of the authentication in the proposed scheme.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this section, we begin with a security analysis of our approach to prove its strength to security attacks. After that, we show the computational efficiency of the scheme through performance analysis.

A. Security Analysis

In this subsection, we demonstrate that our approach is secure against several security attacks. We define an intelligent off-body attacker $A$ that can perform all the operations outlined in the threat model.

1) Impersonation Attack

We assume that $A$ pretends to be SN to CN by sending $Auth_{req.}$ to CN. Upon reception of the message, the CN obtains the RSS value of the message represented as $RSS_{CN}$ and sends $Auth_{ack.}$ to the $A$. Next, $A$ obtains the RSS value of the message represented as $RSS_{A}$ and computes $X_{A} = K_{SN_A} \oplus ID_{A}, Y_{A} = X_{A} \oplus K_{CN_A}$, and $V_{1} = ID_{A}^{RSS_{A}}$. $A$ then sends $(V_{1}, Y_{A})$ to the CN. Upon reception of the message from $A$, the CN generates $X_{A} = Y_{A} \oplus K_{CN}, ID_{A} = K_{SN} \oplus X_{A},$ and $V_{1}^{*} = ID_{A}^{RSS_{CN}}$. First of all, the generated $X_{A}$ by the CN is not equal to the one generated by $A$ because the $K_{CN_A}$ used by $A$ is different from the $K_{CN}$ used by the CN (i.e., $K_{CN_A} \neq K_{CN}$). Second, the generated $ID_{A}$ by the CN is also different from that of the $A$ because the $K_{SN}$ and $X_{A}$ used by the CN are different from those which the $A$ used. Third, the generated $V_{1}$ and $V_{1}^{*}$ by the $A$ and the CN are not related because the $A$ is not located on the same body as the CN and thus, its generated $RSS_{A}$ used to compute $V_{1}$ is not related to the $RSS_{CN}$ of the CN used to compute $V_{1}^{*}$. Thus, the difference between the $V_{1}$ and $V_{1}^{*}$ will be greater than the threshold value with high probability (i.e., $|V_{1} - V_{1}^{*}| > \sigma$). The same analysis applies to when $A$ attempts to impersonate CN to SN. Thus, our scheme can resist the impersonation attack.

2) Replay Attack

The attacker $A$ can intercept the tuple $(V_{1}, Y_{SN})$ from SN and replay it to CN to disguise as a legitimate SN. This attack will be detected by the CN since the $RSS_{SN}$ used to generate $V_{1}$ is unique and randomly generated in each session. Thus, $V_{1}$ and $Y_{SN}$ of one session cannot be considered legitimate in another session. The same analysis applies to when $A$ attempts to replay the tuple $(V_{2}, Y_{CN})$ from CN to SN. Therefore, our proposed approach is resistant to the replay attack.

3) Anonymity and Unlinkability of Sessions

Let us assume that $A$ intercepts communications from SN to CN and from CN to SN. The goal here is to ensure that from the intercepted messages, $A$ cannot obtain the real identities of the communicating devices or link any two or more sessions to the same device. First of all, the real identities of the devices $ID_{SN}$ and $ID_{CN}$ are never placed on the channel in plain text in our scheme. Moreover, none of the $Auth_{req.}$ or $Auth_{ack.}$ identifiers contains the identities of the devices. Let us consider the tuple $(V_{1}, Y_{SN})$ from SN to CN. We have $V_{1} = ID_{SN}^{RSS_{SN}}$, where $RSS_{SN}$ is randomly generated by SN in each session. Thus, $A$ cannot associate two separate authentication parameter $V_{1}$ with the same SN. The same analysis applies to the tuple $(V_{2}, Y_{CN})$. As these parameters are random, updated, and distinct in each session, $A$ cannot associate two or more sessions with the same device. Thus, by utilizing channel characteristics, our scheme ensures the anonymity of the devices and the unlinkability of the sessions.
4) Man-in-the-Middle Attack

We assume that $\mathcal{A}$ intercepts messages $(V_1, Y_{SN})$ and $(V_2, Y_{CN})$ and attempts to modify these messages as a man-in-the-middle. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can generate $RSS_A$ and try to compute $V_1$. However, without having $ID_{SN}$ and the correct RSS value (since it is not located on the body), $\mathcal{A}$ cannot generate the correct $V_1$. Likewise, to modify $Y_{SN}$, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has to get $X_{SN}$, $K_{CN}$, and $K_{SN}$, which are all secret and unknown to $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot modify or generate the tuple $(V_1, Y_{SN})$. Similarly, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot modify or generate the tuple $(V_2, Y_{CN})$ because it cannot be able to generate the correct RSS value and does not know the secretly shared $K_{SN}$, $K_{CN}$, and $ID_{CN}$. Thus, our approach can prevent the man-in-the-middle attack.

5) Active and Passive Eavesdropping Attacks

The attacker $\mathcal{A}$ that can eavesdrop on all messages can obtain $Auth_{req}$, $Auth_{ack}$, $V_1$, $Y_{SN}$, $E(K_S[DATA])$, $V_2$, and $Y_{CN}$ from the common wireless channel. We need to protect $K_S$ to prevent $\mathcal{A}$ from launching either active or passive eavesdropping attacks. It should be noted that the $K_S$ in our approach is computed using a random number generator that takes the results of $RSS_{SN}$ as a seed, where $RSS_{SN}$ and $RSS_{CN}$ are random and unknown to $\mathcal{A}$. First of all, $\mathcal{A}$ does not know the identities $ID_{SN}$ and $ID_{CN}$ of SN and CN, respectively. $\mathcal{A}$ cannot get $RSS_{SN}$ and $RSS_{CN}$ from $V_1$ and $V_2$, respectively. Second, none of the $Y_{SN}$, $Y_{CN}$, $Auth_{req}$, $Auth_{ack}$, or $E(K_S[DATA])$ contains any information about the $RSS_{SN}$ or $RSS_{CN}$, which $\mathcal{A}$ can use to generate the $K_S$. Therefore, our scheme is resilient to the eavesdropping attacks, which can either be active or passive.

6) Channel Estimation Attack

We suppose that attacker $\mathcal{A}$ in our scheme uses the knowledge of its RSS value denoted as $RSS_A$ and its distance to the CN and attempts to estimate the $RSS_{CN}$ and $RSS_{SN}$ of CN and SN, respectively. This type of attack is difficult to succeed in our scheme because of the following reasons. First, the pattern of the signal propagation on the body is directly affected by the surface of the body and has little to do with the distance between the transceivers. Thus, the continuous adjustment of the distance by $\mathcal{A}$ between itself and the CN will not give a similar effect to the signal as the surface and tissues of the body. Second, the multipath nature of the communication channel between the CN and the attacker means that the received signal at the CN is a combination of signals coming from several multipath channels. This environmental effect on the signal leads to the signal having a signature when the CN communicates with the attacker that is different from when the CN communicates with the SN. Due to the above reasons, the channel estimation attack in our scheme cannot succeed.

7) Mutual Authentication

From the above analysis of security thus far, we understand that only the legitimate SN and CN placed on the same body can generate $V_1$, $V_1'$, $V_2$, and $V_2'$ values, where the results of $|V_1 - V_1'|$ and $|V_2 - V_2'|$ are less than or equal to the threshold value $\sigma$. Thus, SN and CN can confirm the legitimacy of each other by checking whether $|V_2 - V_2'| \leq \sigma$ and $|V_1 - V_1'| \leq \sigma$, respectively. As a result, mutual authentication is provided in our scheme.

B. Performance Analysis

In this subsection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach regarding storage, communication, and computation costs. Moreover, we study the performance of the approach in comparison to the available anonymous authentication approaches of Liu et al. [5], He et al. [6], and Wei et al. [7].

1) Storage Cost

Each SN in our scheme is required to store its $ID_{SN}$, $K_{SN}$, and the CN’s $K_{CN}$, which are respectively 16 bits, 128 bits, and 128 bits. The CN also is required to store its 16 bits $ID_{CN}$, 128 bits $K_{CN}$, and the 128 bits $K_{SN}$ of all the registered SNs. Thus, the storage cost of each SN is 272 bits and that of the CN is 144 + 128$n$, where $n$ stands for the number of the deployed SNs. Thus, the total storage overhead of our approach is 416 + 128$n$ bits.

In Liu et al.’s scheme, each client is required to store $(N, ind_x, right)$, where $N$ and $ind_x$ are elements of an addition group $G_1$ with a prime order $p$, and $right$ is the client’s right. Thus, a client’s storage cost in their scheme is $1024 + 1024 + 64 = 2112$ bits. In He et al.’s scheme, each client stores $(T_{id}, right)$, with $T_{id}$ being an element of $G_1$. Thus, the client’s storage cost in their scheme is $1024 + 64 = 1088$ bits. In Wei et al.’s scheme, on the other hand, each client needs to store $credential = (id_C, \sigma.A_3(pw_C))$, which has a storage overhead of 544 bits.

In Table II we summarize our scheme’s storage cost compared to the other related schemes. From Table II, our approach has less storage cost than the other schemes except for Wei et al. [7] scheme.

2) Communication Cost

The SN and the CN in our approach exchange four messages between them for authentication. In step 1, the SN sends a 32 bits $Auth_{req}$ to the CN. In step 2, the CN replies the SN with $Auth_{ack}$, which is also 32 bits. In step 3, the SN sends the tuple $(V_1, Y_{SN})$ to the CN, which has 751 bits = 128 bits + 879 bits. In step 4, the CN replies the SN with the tuple $(V_2, Y_{CN})$, and the tuple has 751 bits + 128 bits = 879 bits. Thus, the total communication overhead of the proposed method is $32 + 32 + 879 + 879 = 1822$ bits.

In Liu et al.’s scheme, two messages $(d, L, t_C, R', W')$ and $(MAC_{key}(d))$ are exchanged for authentication, where $L$, $R'$, and $W'$ are elements of $G_1$, $d$ is a hash function generated digest, and $t_C$ is a timestamp. Thus, the communication cost of their technique is $160 + 1024 + 32 + 1024 + 1024 = 3264$ bits. In the scheme of He et al., two messages $(F, X, t_e)$ and $(J, Auth)$ are exchanged for authentication, where $F = E(key[id, right, U])$. $J = j.P$, $Auth = MAC(key[F, X, t_e, J])$, $U$ and $X$ are elements of $G_1$, $t_e$ is a timestamp, $right$ and $id$ are client’s right and identity, respectively, $P$ is a generator of a bilinear pairing group, and $j \in Z_q$. Thus, the communication overhead of He et al.’s approach is $1024 + 64 + 1024 + 32 + 160 + 1024 + 32 = 3360$ bits. In Wei et al.’s scheme, three messages with a complete communication cost of 4224 bits are exchanged for authentication.
Table II gives a communication cost comparison of our technique among the existing techniques. From Table II, our technique has a lighter and efficient communication overhead compared to the related techniques.

TABLE II. Comparisons of our scheme and the existing schemes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Storage cost (bits)</th>
<th>Communication cost (bits)</th>
<th>Computation cost (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liu et al. [5]</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>3264</td>
<td>11.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He et al. [6]</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>3360</td>
<td>10.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei et al. [7]</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>4224</td>
<td>8.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our scheme</td>
<td>416 + 128n</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Computation Cost

To determine the computation cost of the proposed scheme, we consider the following operations: $T_{xor}$ is the time for one XOR operation, $T_{log}$ is the time for one log operation, $T_{mul}$ is the time for one big number multiplication operation, and $T_{ks}$ is the time for one session key generation operation. The execution time for each of the operations is determined by repeated experiments using Arduino device. The average of all the experimental results for each operation is then taken as the final value. The execution times of $T_{xor}$, $T_{log}$, $T_{mul}$, and $T_{ks}$ are calculated to be equal to 0.001 ms, 0.003 ms, 0.011 ms, and 2.75 ms, respectively.

In the proposed scheme, ten exclusive-OR operations, two log operations, four big number multiplication operations, and two session key computation operations are executed between SN and CN for authentication and data transmission. Thus, the computational overhead of our scheme is $10 T_{xor} + 2 T_{log} + 4 T_{mul} + 2 T_{ks} \approx 0.006$ s.

The execution times of all the operations performed in both the schemes of Liu et al., He et al., and Wei et al. are determined using a MICAz device, which has similar computation power to the Arduino device used in our experiments. The calculated running times of the bilinear pairing ($T_e$), scalar multiplication ($T_{smul}$), map-to-point hash function ($T_H$), point addition ($T_{add}$), modular exponentiation ($T_{mexp}$), and general hash function ($T_h$) operations used in the schemes are 5.32 s, 2.45 s, 0.89 s, 0.01 s, 1.25 s, and 0.01 s, respectively.

A client in Liu et al.’s technique executes four scalar multiplication operations, one map-to-point hash function operation, two point addition operations, one modular exponentiation operation, and three hash function operations during each authentication round. Thus, the computation overhead of their technique is $4 T_{smul} + 1 T_H + 2 T_{add} + 1 T_{mexp} + 3 T_h \approx 11.95$ s. In He et al.’s scheme, a client performs four scalar multiplication operations, one map-to-point hash function operation, one point addition operation, and four hash function operations during authentication. Thus, the computation overhead of their scheme is $4 T_{smul} + 1 T_H + 1 T_{add} + 4 T_h \approx 10.69$ s. In Wei et al.’s scheme, a client calculates five modular exponentiation operations and three map-to-point hash function operations during authentication. Thus, the computation overhead of their scheme is $5 T_{mexp} + 3 T_H \approx 8.92$ s.

In Table II, we summarize the computation cost of our approach and the related approaches. From Table II, our approach is computationally more effective than the approaches of Liu et al. [5], He et al. [6], and Wei et al. [7]. This is due to the complex bilinear pairing, modular exponentiation, and scalar multiplication operations used in the related schemes.

VI. EVALUATION IN REAL ENVIRONMENTS

In this section, we study the performance of our approach in indoor and outdoor places and discuss the experimental results.

A. Experimental Methodology

1) Implementation and Setup

As shown in Fig. 5, four devices (three Arduino UNO R3 devices and one Huawei Android Smartphone) are used in the experimental evaluation of the proposed scheme. The Arduino devices, which are used to emulate the on-body sensor devices, have a portable battery and an optional sensor suite. They are fitted with a bluetooth 4.0 chipset to communicate at the 2.45 GHz band with the smartphone, which runs android 8.1 firmware. We implement the proposed scheme on the smartphone and the Arduino devices as an android background service and a sketch, respectively. As depicted in Fig. 5, two out of the three Arduino devices are used as legitimate on-body devices (i.e., the SNs), which are placed on the body of a volunteer using a strap for ease of movements. Specifically, one of them is located at the left shoulder and the other at the right thigh. The smartphone is positioned at the center of the volunteer’s body and used as the controller node (CN). Moreover, we asked another volunteer to hold the third Arduino device to emulate the off-body attacker $A$.
during the experiments. At the end of each experiment set, we collect RSS measurements of the messages exchanged between the devices and store them on the external storage of the smartphone for analysis.

2) Volunteers

Six volunteers labeled as V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, and V6 (age 28 ± 5 years, height 6 ± 1 ft, weight 150 ± 30 lbs) were involved in the experiments, which lasted for 20 minutes on each volunteer, with 10 minutes used in the lab and the other 10 minutes used in the corridor.

3) Evaluation Metrics

We use attack detection rate (ADR) and false alarm rate (FAR) as metrics to assess the performance of the proposed scheme.

ADR: This is defined as the rate at which attack messages are rejected.

FAR: This is defined as the rate at which legitimate messages are mistakenly rejected.

ADR and FAR are computed as

\[
ADR = \frac{\text{number of attack requests rejected}}{\text{total number of attack requests}} \times 100\%, \tag{6}
\]

\[
FAR = \frac{\text{number of legitimate requests rejected}}{\text{total number of legitimate requests}} \times 100\%. \tag{7}
\]

As previously explained, the effectiveness of our scheme depends on the estimated value of the threshold \( \sigma \). We notice that when the value of \( \sigma \) is very high, messages from the attacker are accepted as legitimate messages and thus the ADR of our scheme becomes low. If the value of the \( \sigma \) is very low, however, numerous legitimate messages are considered as attack messages and rejected, which leads to high FAR in the scheme. Thus, we carefully choose the value of the threshold \( \sigma \) that gives high ADR and low FAR in our scheme.

B. Performance Results and Discussions

In this subsection, we first investigate the performance of our approach in different places and body movements. After that, we examine the approach’s overall performance on all the volunteers. In all the experiments conducted, a network setup of three on-body devices and one off-body attacker device is considered as illustrated in Fig. 5.

1) ADR and FAR of Our Scheme in Different Places and Body Movements

We validate the authentication efficiency of the presented approach in the lab and the corridor environments based on the following body movements of the volunteers: 1) sitting and standing in the lab, and 2) standing and walking in the corridor, both of which can be performed easily in real life. Essentially, the lab signal propagation differs noticeably from the corridor propagation with regard to multipath fading, shadowing, and direct path loss.

As shown in Fig. 6(a), our scheme achieves an average ADR of 86.7\% and 90.8\% in the lab and the corridor, respectively. Interestingly, we observe from the results that the corridor has a higher ADR than the lab, which we believe is attributed to the less multipath variations in the corridor, which consequently leads to fewer messages from the attacker to be mistakenly characterized as legitimate ones. The lower ADR of the scheme in the lab, on the other hand, can be partly attributed to the fact that the lab tends to have a serious multipath impact on the signal because of the proximity between the volunteers and the signal reflecting objects (walls, computers, and desks) in the lab.

Moreover, as illustrated in Fig. 6(b), the proposed scheme has an average FAR of 15.6\% and 16.2\% in the lab and the corridor, respectively. According to Fig. 6(b), the lab shows a lower FAR than the corridor. This is mainly because the disturbances on the signal caused by other people in the lab are less compared to those caused by the people frequently passing by in the corridor environment. In spite of the above differences, these results are consistent with those reported in the previous works [27], [28] and have shown the efficiency of our scheme in providing anonymous authentication in the
presence of real-world environmental noise.

2) ADR and FAR of Our Scheme on Different Volunteers

We investigate the overall performance of the proposed scheme on each of the six volunteers. In these experiments, each of the volunteers is not restricted to any specific body movement or environment. The volunteers wander randomly and sometimes walk alongside each other in both the lab and the corridor for the duration of the experiments. In both the experiments, the wearers converse with one another while making casual gestures.

As shown in Fig. 7, our scheme achieves the average ADR and FAR of 88.8% and 15.9%, respectively. Specifically, it can correctly recognize 84.1% of on-body legitimate devices and successfully prevent 88.8% of active attack attempts from the off-body attacker. From the Fig. 7, we can see that due to the differences in the body features of the volunteers, our scheme’s performance on each of the volunteers is different. Nonetheless, the results demonstrate the robustness of the proposed approach in providing anonymous authentication in WBAN with minimum overhead.

Fig. 7. Overall attack detection and false alarm rates of the proposed scheme for different volunteers.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this study, we presented a computationally efficient anonymous authentication approach for WBAN based on signal propagation characteristics. Our scheme utilizes the distinct RSS variation profiles between on-body and off-body channels to mask the identities of communicating devices, thereby ensuring their anonymity during authentication. Through rigorous analysis of security and computational complexity, we showed that our approach is secure against security attacks and ensures the anonymity of the communicating devices with a minimum computation cost. Moreover, the results of the real-world experiments we carried out on 6 human volunteers demonstrate that our scheme can successfully recognize 84.1% of legitimate on-body devices anonymously and detect 88.8% of active attack attempts. For the future, we plan to conduct additional security analysis of the proposed scheme using one of the formal methods and tools such as BAN logic and AVISPA. Moreover, the design simplicity of the proposed scheme gives it an edge over existing schemes as an appropriate choice for practical WBAN applications and other settings that require computationally inexpensive anonymous authentication schemes, such as wireless sensor networks and internet of vehicle computing.

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